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Abstract
Background: Response inhibition can be classified into stimulus-driven inhibition and intentional inhibition based
on the degree of endogenous volition involved. In the past decades, abundant research efforts to study the effects
of alcohol on inhibition have focused exclusively on stimulus-driven inhibition. The novel Chasing Memo task
measures stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition within the same paradigm. Combined with the stop-signal task,
we investigated how alcohol use affects behavioral and psychophysiological correlates of intentional inhibition, as
well as stimulus-driven inhibition.
Methods: Experiment I focused on intentional inhibition and stimulus-driven inhibition in relation to past-year
alcohol use. The Chasing Memo task, the stop-signal task, and questionnaires related to substance use and
impulsivity were administered to 60 undergraduate students (18–25 years old). Experiment II focused on behavioral
and neural correlates acute alcohol use on performance on the Chasing Memo task by means of electroencephalography
(EEG). Sixteen young male adults (21–28 years old) performed the Chasing Memo task once under placebo and once
under the influence of alcohol (blood alcohol concentration around 0.05%), while EEG was recorded.
Results: In experiment I, AUDIT (Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test) total score did not significantly predict stimulus-
driven inhibition or intentional inhibition performance. In experiment II, the placebo condition and the alcohol condition
were comparable in terms of behavioral indices of stimulus-driven inhibition and intentional inhibition as well as task-
related EEG patterns. Interestingly, a slow negative readiness potential (RP) was observed with an onset of about 1.2 s,
exclusively before participants stopped intentionally.
Conclusions: These findings suggest that both past-year increases in risky alcohol consumption and moderate acute
alcohol use have limited effects on stimulus-driven inhibition and intentional inhibition. These conclusions cannot be
generalized to alcohol use disorder and high intoxication levels. The RP might reflect processes involved in the formation
of an intention in general.
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Background
Imagine having cocktails with friends at a bar during
happy hour time, and experiencing a strong urge to
order one more. But then you realize that you need to
prepare for an important meeting the next morning and
you decide to refrain from having another drink. In
examples like this, there is no external cue signaling a
brake, yet you voluntarily suppress your urge for the
sake of other priorities. Here, we refer to this type of
cognitive control as intentional inhibition. In the current
study, we will investigate how intentional inhibition 1) is
associated with typical alcohol use and 2) affected by
acute alcohol consumption.
Alcohol use and inhibition
Inhibitory control is defined as the ability to control one’s
attention, behavior, thoughts, and/or emotions and instead
do what is more appropriate or needed [1]. This ability
enables us to override strong internal predispositions or
external lures, and do what is more appropriate or needed.
Long-term alcohol use has been associated with structural
as well as functional neural deficits that are related to in-
hibition [2]. For instance, alcohol-dependent patients show
selective deficits in prefrontal gray and white matter vol-
ume [3]; compared to light drinkers, heavy drinkers were
slower to stop inappropriate responses and showed deviant
amplitudes of the P3 (a brain potential that correlates with
the efficiency of response inhibition) [4]. Despite relatively
robust neurological evidence for inhibition deficits, alcohol
use severity is not consistently associated with impaired
behavioral performance of response inhibition [5–7].
Acute alcohol use (moderate to high dosage), by con-
trast, was more consistently related with inhibition defi-
cits [8, 9] and reduced amplitudes of inhibition-related
brain potentials [10].
Intentional inhibition
Theoretically, motor inhibition can be classified into
stimulus-driven inhibition and intentional inhibition based
on the degree of endogenous volition involved [11]. A
daily-life example of stimulus-driven inhibition is stopping
to a traffic-light that suddenly turns to red. The past de-
cades have seen abundant research efforts exclusively into
the effects of alcohol on stimulus-driven inhibition (see re-
views: [12–14]). However, rather than relying on external
cues, deciding independently when and/or whether to
abort an action plays an even more important role in daily
life [15]. Intentional inhibition refers to the capacity to
voluntarily suspend or inhibit an about-to-be-executed
action at the last moment [16]. In terms of drinking, the
priming dose effect of alcohol, i.e., loss of control over
further consumption after a priming dosage, reflects the
insufficiency of intentional inhibition rather than
stimulus-driven inhibition [17].
There have been several attempts to study intentional
inhibition using varieties of the Libet task [18], the Marble
Task [19], and the modified go/no-go task [20, 21]. To
investigate intentional inhibition, these tasks usually
included a free-choice condition, where participants were
encouraged to act/inhibit voluntarily and roughly equally
across all the trials. For instance, in the Marble task, par-
ticipants view a white marble rolling down a ramp. In 50%
of the trials, the marble turns green and participants have
to stop it from crashing as fast as possible by pressing the
button. If the marble remains white, the participants can
choose between performing the prepared action (i.e., stop
the marble) and execution of intentional inhibition (i.e.,
do not stop the marble). Such “free choice” design is
suboptimal in at least three ways regarding the concept of
intentional inhibition. First, the choice between acting and
withholding is relatively arbitrary; little (if anything) really
hinges on whether the participant decides to act or not on
any particular trial. Accordingly, participants might be-
have in a way that they believe will satisfy the experi-
menters’ definition of volition. Second, participants are
subject to substantial time pressure, which may prevent
the time-consuming development of spontaneous inten-
tions. Third, participants may pre-decide on whether and
when to inhibit ahead of time (even before the start of the
trial) rather than on the fly [22], even when emphasizing
that this is to be avoided. Thus, the study of intentional in-
hibition may be augmented by using more ecologically
valid tasks.
The present study
To address these points, a novel task was developed, in
which stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition can be
measured under comparable conditions that are ecologic-
ally more representative (Rigoni, Brass, van den Wilden-
berg, & Ridderinkhof, unpublished manuscript). In the
current study, we will investigate if and how alcohol use
affects intentional inhibition in two complementary ways.
Experiment I focuses on prolonged (i.e., last year) alcohol
use in relation to intentional versus stimulus-driven inhib-
ition with a relatively large sample. The Chasing Memo
task, as well as the classic stop-signal task (SST), were
administered. Experiment II investigates the behavioral
and neural effects of acute alcohol use on the Chasing
Memo task performance. Electroencephalographic (EEG)
activity was recorded in a smaller sample, with a double-
blind, placebo-controlled, within-subject design.
Experiment I
Introduction
The aim of the Experiment I was to test whether past-year
typical alcohol use influenced stimulus-driven as well as
intentional inhibition. Extensive research into the effects
of long-term alcohol use on stimulus-driven inhibition has
Liu et al. BMC Psychology             (2020) 8:2 Page 2 of 20
been documented, but the conclusions are inconsistent.
Some researchers found that compared to controls, heavy
drinkers showed impaired stopping performance, signified
by either longer stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) on the
SST [4] or higher commission error rates in the go/no-go
task (GNG) [23, 24]. These findings, however, conflict with
a series of other studies. For instance, a meta-analysis of dif-
ferences between heavy drinkers and controls reported
null-effects with respect to inhibitory impairments in 9 out
of 12 GNG studies and in 7 out of 9 studies using the SST
[13]. Similarly, in a recent retrospective epidemiological
study among 2230 adolescents, longitudinal analyses
showed that 4 years of weekly heavy drinking did not result
in impairments in basic executive function, including in-
hibitory control [25].
In the literature, two types of impulsivity have been dis-
cerned that may trigger failures of inhibitory control: ‘stop-
ping impulsivity’ and ‘waiting impulsivity’, which rest on
largely distinct neural circuits [26, 27]. ‘Stopping impulsiv-
ity’ refers to impairments in the ability to interrupt an
already initiated action, whereas ‘waiting impulsivity’ refers
to impairments in the ability to refrain from responding
until sufficient information has been gathered or a waiting
interval has elapsed. Stopping and waiting impulsivity have
typically been tested in the SST and in the delay discount-
ing task, respectively [28]. In the Chasing Memo task
(Rigoni et al., unpublished manuscript), participants were
asked to use the computer mouse to move the cursor and
chase a small fish, called Memo, as it moves across the
screen (“swimming” against a nautical background picture).
Participants disengaged from visuomotor tracking in re-
sponse to either an external stop cue (i.e., stimulus-driven
inhibition) or at will (i.e., intentional inhibition).
Meanwhile, to supplement and validate the stimulus-
driven inhibition component of the new task, the conven-
tional SST was also administered [29]. In addition to
laboratory-based tasks, two sets of questionnaires were
also administered. The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-
11) [30], and Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory (DII) [31],
were used to test impulsivity. Substance use was tested by
the AUDIT (Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test)
[32], the mFTQ (modified version of the Fagerström toler-
ance questionnaire) [33], the CUDIT-R (cannabis use dis-
order identification test revised) [34], and the CORE (the
core alcohol and drug survey) [35].
The current study focuses on college students, for
whom alcohol is one of the most frequently used sub-
stances, and it gives rise to unsafe drinking-&-driving be-
havior and the consumption of other substances [36].
Although prior work (as reviewed above) has not yielded
consistent results, we tested the hypothesis that higher
AUDIT scores (i.e., more risky alcohol use within the past
12months) were associated with prolonged SSRTs (analo-
gous to longer disengage latencies in the cued version of
the Chasing Memo task). For intentional inhibition in the
Chasing Memo task, we conceived of two opposing sce-
narios: analogous to stimulus-driven inhibition, past-year
alcohol use induces ‘stopping impulsivity’ and delays
intentional disengagement; alternatively, it induces ‘wait-
ing impulsivity’ and results in faster disengagement times
[27]. Although the lack of existing studies on alcohol and
intentional inhibition prevents us from inferring strong
theory-based hypotheses, the present task set-up will allow
us to empirically distinguish between them.
Methods1
Participants
Eighty-six undergraduate students (10 males) were
recruited (age: Mean = 20.77, SD = 1.86). Inclusion
criteria included: 1) between 18 and 25 years old; 2)
no report of head injuries, colorblindness or seizures;
3) no prior and current diagnosis of depression; 4)
proper mastery of Dutch, as all task instructions and
questionnaires were shown in Dutch. Due to incorrect
settings of refresh rates on some test computers, we
cannot use the Chasing Memo data from a subset of
26 participants.2 Thus, the analyses of the Chasing
Memo task were based on the remaining 60 subjects
(6 males, 20.75 ± 2.01 years old).
Questionnaires
The BIS-11 is a 30-item questionnaire designed to assess
the personality/behavioral construct of impulsiveness
[30]. The DII included two subscales: functional impul-
sivity (11 items) and dysfunctional impulsivity (12
items). The AUDIT is a 10-item survey used as a screen-
ing instrument for excessive or hazardous alcohol use
[32]. It covers the domains of recent alcohol consump-
tion (items 1–3), alcohol dependence symptoms (items
4–7), and alcohol-related problems (items 8–10). The
mFTQ assesses the level of nicotine dependence among
adolescents [33]. The CUDIT-R was used to identify
individuals who have used cannabis in problematic or
harmful ways during the preceding 6 months [34]. The
CORE was originally designed to examine the use, scope,
and consequences of alcohol and other drugs in the col-
lege settings [35]. In the current research, participants
were asked to indicate how often within the last year
and month they had used each of the 11 types of
drugs. Reliability of these questionnaires can be found
in Additional file 1.
1This was part of YL’s PhD thesis [37].
2For computers with incorrect refresh rate settings, Memo moved at
twice of the speed as planned, which made the moment of
disengagement incomparable.
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Behavioral tasks
Chasing memo task In this task, an animated fish called
Memo is moving (‘swimming’) at 360 pixels/sec against
the background of the bottom of an ocean, changing
directions at random angles between 0 and 115 degrees,
at intervals between 556 and 1250 ms. The participants’
main task was to track the fish by keeping a yellow dot
(operated through the computer mouse) within close
proximity of Memo (i.e., within a green zone of 2 cm
radius surrounding it). Points were earned per second
during successful tracking (i.e., as long as the cursor is
within this green zone) and accumulated points were
displayed in the bottom right corner of the screen
(tracking points). These points accumulated faster as a
linear function of time spent within the green proximity
zone. Accumulation rate was indicated to the subject by
a red/green bar, which turned from red to green as a
function of accurate tracking (see Fig. 1). Upon failures
to chase Memo (i.e., failing to keep the yellow dot within
the green zone), accumulation rates were reset, and ac-
cumulation of points would again start slowly as soon as
the participant resumed successful tracking and then rise
as a function of accurate tracking time. Participants were
told that tracking points were converted to real money,
which can yield up to 5 euro extra at the end of the
experiment. Thus, participants had a strong immediate
incentive motivation to continue accurate tracking.
A circle at the top left corner of the green zone served
as the external signal to start and stop tracking. At the
beginning of the trial, the circle was colored orange;
after a variable delay (between 3 and 6 s) it turned blue
(go signal), indicating that participants can start tracking
the target. The specific instructions differed depending
on the experimental condition.
In the cued condition, participants were instructed to
start tracking as fast as possible when the go signal
appeared (cued engagement) and stop as soon as possible
if the circle turned orange again, i.e., the stop signal (cued
disengagement). Participants were asked to disengage by
leaving the mouse completely still in its end position. The
trial ended 2 s after tracking disengagement. Within the
colored circle, there was a counter with a serial display of
digits constituting a number (between 100 and 999). Every
100ms, that number incremented by 1 until the value of
999 was reached, after which the counter was reset to 100.
Participants had to remember the number when the stop
cue appeared and type in the number by the end of a trial
and how confident they were about their answers (from 1
to 7). This is used as the timing accuracy index.
In the free condition, participants can freely decide when
to start tracking after the go signal appeared. After uninter-
rupted successful tracking for 2 s, a bonus signal, signified
by a yellow star, was displayed next to the red/green meter
(Fig. 1). Its appearance signaled the beginning of a 20 s (par-
ticipants did not know the length) temporal window within
which participants were to continue tracking until they felt
the urge to stop. Disengagement meant foregoing the im-
mediate reward (increase in normal points) in favor of the
future reward (bonus points). The number of bonus points
varied between 2 and 50 and was determined by the disen-
gagement moment. Participants were instructed that some
variability in their tracking latency (within the margins of
not stopping too soon nor too late) would benefit an opti-
mal amount of bonus points. Unbeknownst to the partici-
pants, the time at which the star was lost was determined
Fig. 1 The Chasing Memo Task. a Background display for the motor tracking task. Participants were instructed to track fish Memo around the
screen by keeping the mouse within the green zone surrounding the target. On each trial, a counter was displayed on the bottom right of the
screen which displayed the points earned during successful tracking; b When the circle turned from orange to blue, participants started tracking
either at will (intentional condition) or as quickly as possible (cued condition); c During successful tracking, the half-circle red bar gradually turned
green, signaling that the participant started to earn points; d In the cued condition, the circle switched back to orange to signal that the
participant has to stop tracking as quickly as possible; e In the intentional condition, the appearance of a star indicated the beginning of a time
window in which the participant can earn additional bonus points. In these trials, participants can decide voluntarily when to disengage from
motor tracking in order to collect the bonus points
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stochastically by drawing randomly from a normal distribu-
tion, such that the optimum waiting time was 10 s on aver-
age; prolonged tracking would be highly beneficial on some
trials but highly detrimental on others. Within each block
of the free condition, bonus points were accumulated across
trials and converted into extra time (1 second per earned
bonus point) for tracking in a later bonus trial. In a bonus
trial, participants can earn tracking-points 4 times as fast as
that in a regular trial. Thus, more bonus points result
in a higher total of tracking-points (and hence in
greater earnings). In order to prevent undesirable
response tendencies, participants were instructed and
trained to follow their urge rather than preplan their
time of disengagement or use external cues (such as
spatial position or counter value) to determine the time
of disengagement. As in the cued condition, participants
now had to register and report the number of this
counter at the time they first felt the urge (or conscious
intention) to disengage, i.e., the W-moment [38].
Detailed instructions were provided at the beginning of the
experiment, and participants performed a guided practice ses-
sion to familiarize them with the task. The entire experimen-
tal session consisted of 6 cued and 6 free blocks of 10 trials
each. Cued and free blocks were presented in alternating
order and every free block was followed by a bonus trial.
SST Similar to the task used by van den Wildenberg
et al., (2006), participants were required to respond
quickly and accurately with the corresponding index fin-
ger to the direction of a right- or a left-pointing green
arrow (go trials). Arrow presentation was response-
terminated. The green arrow changed to red on 25% of
the trials (stop trials), upon which the go response had to
be aborted. Intervals between subsequent go signals varied
randomly but equiprobably, from 1750 to 2250ms in steps
of 50ms, where a black fixation point (10 × 10 pixels) was
presented. A staircase-tracking procedure dynamically ad-
justed the delay between the onset of the go signal and the
onset of the stop signal (SSD) for each hand separately to
control inhibition probability [39]. SSD started at 100ms
and increased by 50ms after a successful inhibition, and
decreased by 50ms after a failed inhibition. The SST con-
sisted of five blocks of 60 trials, the first of which served as
a practice block to obtain stable performance [29]. The
SST measures both the efficiency of response execution
(mean reaction time to correct go-signals, go RT) and the
latency of stimulus-driven inhibitory control (SSRT),
where longer SSRT reflects a general slowing of inhibitory
processes [40]. The integration method was used for SSRT
calculation [41, 42].
Procedure
All participants signed informed consent prior to the la-
boratory session. They performed two computer tasks in
a counterbalanced sequence, with a series of question-
naires in between, and the behavioral tasks were
administered using Presentation® software [43]. The pro-
cedures were approved by the local ethics committee
and complied with institutional guidelines and the dec-
laration of Helsinki. Participants were rewarded either
€15 or 1.5 credit points upon accomplishment.
Data preparation and statistical analysis
Chasing memo task Although Disengage RT was our
measurement of primary interest, Engage RT was also
analyzed to verify whether chronic alcohol use affected
basic response speed. Engage RT (the time from the en-
gage color change until the start of tracking) was calcu-
lated for both cued and free conditions. Engage RTs less
than 100 ms were discarded from the analysis, resulting
in 3360 (93.3%) out of 3600 trials for the cued condition
and 3381 (93.9%) for the free condition. Disengage RT
in the cued condition was calculated by subtracting the
time of the disengage color change from the time at
which tracking was completely halted. For the free con-
dition, Disengage RT is the time from the appearance of
the bonus star until the time of arrested tracking. Before
analysis, 376 (10.4%) trials in the free condition were re-
moved as intentional inhibition failures, i.e., participants
did not stop tracking within the provided time window
(20 s).
The W-interval in the free condition was computed as
the interval between the reported W-moment until the
time of the actual stopping. In the cued condition, tim-
ing accuracy was the difference between the reported
and the actual appearance moment of the stop signal.
For all RT-related dependent variables, the median ra-
ther than mean value was used for further analysis as RT
distributions were not normally distributed for all of the
participants (skewed to the left for some participants
and to the right for others). Engage RT and Disengage
RT were analyzed using multiple linear regressions with
AUDIT sum score3 (AUDIT sum was nearly normally
distributed with Skewness of 0.06 and Kurtosis of − 0.68)
and Inhibition Category (free vs. cued) as predictors,
controlling for gender.4 The possible association be-
tween past-year alcohol use and timing accuracy was ex-
amined by Pearson correlation. W-interval was analyzed
3Participants were not dichotomized into light and heavy drinkers
during recruitment and data analysis stage as there was individual
variance of alcohol consumption in these broad groups and artificial
dichotomization reduces the power to detect subtle individual
differences [44]. In addition, we replicated these analyses by replacing
AUDIT total score by AUDIT-C (the first three items of AUDIT),
which is not limited to the past 12 months.
4Other substances use were not added as a covariate as they were
highly correlated with the AUDIT score (see Table 2).
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with AUDIT score as a predictor and controlled for tim-
ing accuracy. These analyses were performed using SPSS
24.0 [45].
SST The successful inhibition percentages on inhibition
trials ranged from 28.3 to 63.3% (M = 49.6%, SD = 4.67%),
which meets the requirements of the integration method
for SSRT calculation [41]. To compute go RT, only correct
responses were taken into account. Afterward, similar
regression analyses as the Chasing Memo task was per-
formed for SSRT and go RT separately without the factor
of Inhibition Category. We analyzed data once with all the
participants (N = 86) and once with those also had Chas-
ing Memo task performance (N = 60).
In addition, two correlation matrices were built: 1)
correlations between different substances use; 2) correla-
tions between different measures of impulsivity (Disen-
gage RT in the free condition, SSRT, BIS-11 score, and
DII score).
Combination of conventional and Bayesian-based
analysis To quantify the strength of our findings beyond
standard significance testing and to remedy the relatively
small sample size caused by the technical failure, the main
hypotheses were also examined by calculating a Bayes Fac-
tor using Bayesian Information Criteria [46–49]. The
Bayes factor provides the odds ratio (BF01) for the null
versus the alternative hypotheses given a particular data
set (BF10 is simply the inverse of BF01). A value of 1 means
that the null and alternative hypotheses are equally likely;
values larger than 1 suggest that the data are in favor of
the null hypothesis, and values smaller than 1 indicate that
the data are in favor of the alternative hypothesis. A BF01
between 1 and 3 indicates anecdotal evidence for the null
compared to an alternative hypothesis, 3–10 indicates
moderate evidence and 10–30 indicates strong evidence
[50, 51]. The BFs were calculated with JASP 0.9.2.0., an
open-source statistical package [52].
Results
Sample characteristics
Descriptive statistics (i.e., mean, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum values) of the tested variables
(demographics, substance use, task performance, and
trait impulsivity) can be found in Table 1.
Chasing memo task
Task difficulty was assessed by the number of times one
lost the star. Out of the 120 trials, on average partici-
pants lost the star 31 times (SD = 21), ranging from 6 to
145. This indicates that most of the participants have a
good mastery of the task and should be able to allocate
attention to their behavioral intentions.
Variables used in the regression analyses were checked
for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors
(VIF) before being entered into the multivariate analyses;
VIF for all variables were below 2 for the following re-
gression models. The linear regression model for Engage
RT was not significant (F (3, 116) = 0.99, p = 0.39), with
a R2 of 0.025. None of the explanatory variables signifi-
cantly predicted Engage RT (AUDIT: β = 0.10, p = 0.29;
Inhibition Category: β = − 0.02, p = 0.84; gender: β = −
0.12, p = 0.19). Bayesian linear regression showed that
the null model provided a fit that was 2.2 times better
than the model that added the factor gender, 3.0 times
better than the model that added AUDIT and 5.1 times
better than the model that added Inhibition Category.
The linear regression model for Disengage RT was
significant (F (3, 116) = 94.48, p < 0.01), with a R2 of 0.71.
Inhibition Category significantly predicted Disengage RT
(β = 0.84, p < 0.01). Disengage RT was much longer in the
free condition than in the stimulus-driven inhibition (8662
ms vs. 749ms). Neither AUDIT (β = − 0.06, p = 0.27) nor
gender (β = 0.06, p = 0.27) predicted Disengage RT. Bayes
factor analysis confirmed this by showing that the model
with factor Inhibition Category provided a fit that was 7.0
times and 7.2 times better than the model that further
added factor Gender and AUDIT, respectively.
Past-year risky alcohol consumption is not associated
with alteration in timing accuracy (r = − 0.21, p = 0.10,
BF01 = 1.66). The linear regression model for W-interval
was not significant (F (2, 57) = 0.14, p = 0.87), with a R2 of
0.005. None of the explanatory variables significantly
predicted W-interval (AUDIT: β = − 0.007, p = 0.96; timing
accuracy: β = − 0.071, p = 0.60). Bayes factor analysis
confirmed this by showing that the null model provided a
fit that was 3.4 times, and 3.8 times better than the model
that added the factor Timing Accuracy and AUDIT,
respectively.
SST
There were no qualitative differences between the out-
comes with different sample size (86 vs. 60). We report
the results for the smaller sample size (same as the
Chasing Memo task) below, and the larger sample size
in Additional file 1. The linear regression model for
SSRT was not significant (F (2, 57) = 0.47, p = 0.63), with
a R2 of 0.02. None of the explanatory variables signifi-
cantly predicted SSRT (AUDIT: β = 0.11, p = 0.43; gen-
der: β = 0.07, p = 0.58). Bayes factor analysis confirmed
this by showing that the null model provided a fit that
was 2.9 times, and 3.4 times better than the model that
added the factor AUDIT and Gender, respectively. The
linear regression model for go RT was not significant ei-
ther (F (2, 57) = 2.40, p = 0.10), with a R2 of 0.078.
AUDIT was a significant predictor of go RT (β = − 2.68,
p = 0.04), indicating the higher the AUDIT score the
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shorter the go RT. Gender was not a strong predictor of
go RT (β = − 0.08, p = 0.52). Bayes factor analysis indi-
cated anecdotal evidence for the effect of AUDIT, i.e.,
adding it to the model was just 1.6 times better than the
null model. And the fitness of the null model is 3.3 times
better than adding factor Gender.
Results were very similar when AUDIT-C was used
(see Additional file 1).
Correlation matrix
As was shown in Table 2, alcohol use and other sub-
stances use (e.g., cigarette and cannabis use) were highly
correlated, which can be expected. In Table 3, the cor-
relation matrix revealed three significant correlations be-
tween different impulsivity measures. SSRT correlated
negatively with the attentional subscale of BIS-11 (r = −
0.20, p = 0.03, BF10 = 1275), and correlated positively
with the motor subscale of BIS-11 (r = 0.22, p = 0.01,
BF10 = 2122). In addition, the motor subscale of BIS-11
and the dysfunctional subscale of DII were negatively
correlated (r = − 0.21, p = 0.02, BF10 = 1395). Subscales of
impulsivity, either measure by BIS-11 or DII were not
correlated with Chasing Memo task performance.5
Discussion
In the first experiment, a past-year increase in risky drink-
ing showed no relationship with any of the inhibition-
related tasks and questionnaires. In the SST, alcohol use
slightly speeded response latency, but had no influence on
the inhibition process. In the Chasing Memo task, typical
alcohol use hardly had any effect on Engage RT and Dis-
engage RT, nor did it influence the W-interval. The cor-
relation analysis confirmed the existence of polysubstance
use and the multidimensional feature of impulsivity (i.e.,
impulsivity measures are not largely correlated).
Stimulus-driven inhibition
Our findings on stimulus-driven inhibition were compar-
able between the Chasing Memo task and the standard
SST. For stimulus-driven inhibition as tested by the SST,
the present null findings of past-year alcohol use are repli-
cations of some recent studies [25, 53], but conflicted with
some others [13]. Against the backdrop of the fairly incon-
sistent literature, it’s time to re-assess the connection be-
tween recreational moderate alcohol use and stimulus-
driven inhibition impairment. In the current study, alcohol
use was regarded as a continuous variable, which allowed
drawing conclusions from a relatively complete population.
Relatedly, in our recent individual-level mega-analysis, very
limited evidence supporting such deteriorating relationship
was found across a broad range of substances [54]. As only
a small proportion of the participants are diagnosed with
Substance Use Disorder (SUD), it is still unclear whether
these conclusions would also apply to SUD. By contrast,
the so-called extreme group designs were frequently used in
this field, e.g., comparing light/non-drinkers versus people
with alcohol use disorder (AUD) [55]. Studies with such de-
signs yielded more positive findings [56, 57]. Seemingly,
people located at the very right end of the continuum, i.e.,
those diagnosed with alcohol use disorder indeed have diffi-
culties in inhibition. But it does not necessarily mean these
findings can be generalized readily to the majority who
drink alcohol on a regular/non-hazardous basis, at least on
the behavioral level [58].
Intentional inhibition
Given that this was the first attempt, we did not have firm
a priori predictions on the presence and direction of ef-
fects of alcohol use on intentional inhibition. At least in
the current context, there was no clear effect of alcohol
use on intentional inhibition. The latency of intentional
Table 2 Correlation matrix between substance use
1 2 3 4
1 AUDIT r
BF10
2 CUDIT r 0.27**
BF10 8296.00
3 Fagerström r 0.32** 0.41**
BF10 30,554.00 1593.00
4 CORE/last month r 0.30** 0.41** 0.70**
BF10 24,639.00 5988.00 6.436e + 14
5 CORE/last year r 0.61** 0.48** 0.64** 0.73**
BF10 7.271e + 10 368,020.00 1.679e + 11 3.534e + 18
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
5We only expect a small to moderate relationship between SSRT and
disengage RT as intentional inhibition engaged additional neural
activation albeit common inhibition network with stimulus-driven in-
hibition [22].
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inhibition was expressed by the Disengage RT in the free
condition. Its histogram for each individual either showed
a rectangle or approximately normal (with mean of near
10 s) distribution, which confirms the validity of the ma-
nipulation, in the sense that strategies other than ‘follow-
ing one’s urge’ (such as counting or waiting strategies)
would have resulted in heavily peaked and/or skewed dis-
tributions. Though in the free condition participants ap-
peared to start tracking as soon as possible, this did not
invalidate the operationalization. As Engagement is less of
our focus, we did not emphasize the ‘free will’ as much as
for the Disengagement. Also, no consequences were asso-
ciated with the engage response pattern.
For the W-interval, participants reported to consciously
feel the urge to stop about half a second before the actual
disengagement. The W-interval was similar for both
groups. In the Libet task, the W-moment was reported
200ms before intentional action [38]. This difference in
timing might be due to the dissimilarity between voluntary
action and voluntary inhibition, as well as specific task fea-
tures, which will require further investigation.
Although some limitations may apply, the consistency
of effects and the robustness of the evidence in favor of
the null hypotheses (as confirmed by Bayesian analyses)
appears to justify the conclusion that a limited period
(i.e., 1 year or a bit longer) of heavy drinking does not
affect intentional or stimulus-driven inhibition (at least
not in university students). However, before accepting
such a conclusion, we seek further evidence through
adopting a manipulation that in past research has proven
more potent in inducing alcohol-related effects on
stimulus-driven inhibition. Alcohol use may increase
maladaptive behaviors either because of lasting sequelae
of chronic use or through its direct, acute effects [59].
Acutely, alcohol may impair cue-based inhibition and re-
sult in an increased likelihood of engaging in risky be-
haviors, such as driving while intoxicated. In addition,
alcohol-induced impairments may also affect the likeli-
hood of further unplanned consumption of alcohol [60].
Several laboratory studies showed that a moderate acute
dosage of alcohol use leads to impaired inhibition on
GNG and SST [61, 62]. Therefore, as a next step, we ex-
plored if alcohol intoxication affects stimulus-driven and
intentional inhibition. In addition to behavioral mea-
sures, we also used EEG to record neural activity. This
may reveal the acute effects of alcohol on information
processing that remain hidden when focusing on behav-
ioral outcomes. For example, EEG highlighted the nature
of the effects of alcohol consumption (vs. placebo) on
performance monitoring and error correction [63]. Like-
wise, EEG signals have reflected differences between al-
cohol effects in light versus heavy drinkers in the
absence of differences in behavior [10, 64, 65].
Experiment II
Introduction
The aim of Experiment II was to test whether and how
acute alcohol use influences intentional inhibition. Com-
pared to chronic alcohol use, acute alcohol administra-
tion was more consistently related to impaired stimulus-
driven inhibition [66–71]. By analogy, acute alcohol ad-
ministration might also be more likely to influence
Table 3 Correlation matrix between impulsivity measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Disengage RT (free) r
BF10
2 Disengage RT (cued) r −0.17
BF10 0.38
3 SSRT r 0.02 0
BF10 0.16 0.16
4 BIS attentional r 0.06 −0.05 −0.20*
BF10 0.18 0.17 1275
5 BIS motor r 0.17 0.12 0.22* 0.27**
BF10 0.37 0.25 2122 9251
6 BIS non-planning r 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.30** 0.58*
BF10 0.18 0.31 0.18 26,303 1.863 × 10
9
7 DII dysfunctional r −0.09 −0.16 0.17 0.04 −0.21* −0.11
BF10 0.2 0.33 0.68 0.12 1395 0.22
8 DII functional r 0.09 −0.03 −0.1 −0.15 −0.04 − 0.14 −0.41**
BF10 0.206 0.165 0.206 0.43 0.126 0.353 4859
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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intentional inhibition than chronic alcohol use. Loss-of-
control over drinking depicts the phenomenon that
small to moderate amount of alcohol use induces phys-
ical demand/craving for further drink and promotes
alcohol-seeking behavior [17, 72, 73]. In this way, people
are likely to fail in intentional inhibition and drink more
than planned on a typical drinking occasion.
If alcohol affects intentional inhibition, it may affect
not only the time of overt disengagement but also the
temporal unfolding of that intention. With its unique
temporal resolution, EEG may provide a useful candidate
study tool for this purpose. The EEG component we are
interested in is the readiness potential (RP) or
Bereitschaftspotential. It was first recorded by Kornhu-
ber and Deecke (1964) and attracted broad attention
after Libet and colleagues’ striking work in 1983 [38, 74].
In their experiment, participants were instructed to press
a response button whenever they became aware of the
intention to do so and report the time of this urge (the
W-moment). They found that the W-moment occurred
some 200ms prior to actual action and about 500 ms
after the RP onset [38]. This finding was explained as
the brain decides to initiate certain actions prior to any
reportable subjective awareness, which raised perhaps
unprecedented discussion in the literature. It was re-
cently claimed that the RP might neither give rise to the
W-moment (conscious intention) nor to the voluntary
movement, as the RP occurs 1) before a motor act even
without consciousness of commanding it; 2) in situations
that do not involve movement, such as decision-making
in mental arithmetic [75], and 3) in externally triggered
action [76]. Our concern here is not so much with the
interpretation but with the development and time course
of the processes associated with intentional inhibition.
Only a few studies have investigated the neural mecha-
nisms of intentional inhibition using EEG [20, 21, 77–
80]. Tasks in those studies were suboptimal in terms of
1) the choice between acting and withholding is rela-
tively arbitrary; 2) pre-decision on whether and when to
inhibit cannot be excluded; 3) perhaps tapping into se-
lective choice rather than inhibition, especially when
equiprobable go and no-go trials are used [77, 78]. Thus,
the underlying mechanism might entail not only
intentional inhibition but be confounded by other com-
ponents. The Chasing Memo task remedies these limita-
tions, at least to some extent. A further departure from
some previous studies was that components that are
closely related to stimulus-driven inhibition, such as N2/
P3 [81] were not analyzed. First, for intentional inhib-
ition we focused on neural activities preceding rather
than after intentional inhibition, as 1) this can help pre-
dict when intentional inhibition is likely to happen; 2)
for voluntarily chosen action/inhibition, nearly all cogni-
tive processes happened before execution of the action;
3) there is no external stop-signal to be time-locked to,
which makes the comparison with cued-inhibition on
N2/P3 less relevant. Second, N2/P3 comprises a complex
of well-known EEG component that is typically associ-
ated with cued-inhibition. Since the focus here is not on
replicating previous findings of cued inhibition but on
exploring the neural activities relevant to intentional in-
hibition as compared to cued inhibition, and since no
N2/P3 could be expected (or indeed observed) for
intentional inhibition, our focus was on the RP rather
than the N2/P3 complex.
In Experiment II, we adopted a double-blind, within-
subject cross-over design with participants tested once
under alcohol and once under placebo. Brain activities were
recorded with EEG when they were performing the Chas-
ing Memo task. We hypothesized that the RP appears only
in the intentional inhibition condition but not in the
stimulus-driven inhibition condition. Second, in line with
Experiment I, acute alcohol use may incur either stopping
impulsivity or waiting impulsivity in disengaging from the
action. The finding reported by Libet and colleagues (1983)
suggests that the RP is positively associated with cognitive
engagement and effort with respect to the impending
movement [38]. The more the participant thinks about the
action, the earlier and larger is the RP [82]. Thus, in the
case of stopping impulsivity, the activation required to im-
plement and set off the disengagement from action may
take longer to build up, and may require higher criterion
levels of such activation; hence, acute alcohol should result
in an earlier onset of the RP and a larger area between
onset and peak (area under the curve, AUC). Likewise, in
the case of alcohol-induced waiting impulsivity, a RP onset
that occurs at a relatively brief interval relative to the time
of disengagement and a smaller AUC of the RP should be
expected. As exploratory measures of secondary interest,
we also compute peak amplitudes, and RP interval (from
onset latency to peak latency).
Methods6
Participants
Twenty right-handed male adults independent from Ex-
periment I participated in this study, with an age range
of 21 to 28 years old (M = 24.6, SD = 2.3). Participants
were psychology students recruited from the local cam-
pus. According to self-report, they had a normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, were subjectively in good
health, and had no history of head injuries or neuro-
logical or psychiatric disorders, including obesity and an-
orexia. Although all participants were light to moderate
drinkers in daily life, they did not engage in excessive
consumption of alcohol or drugs and were not addicted
to alcohol or other drugs. The study was approved by
6This was part of YL’s PhD thesis [37].
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the local ethics committee and complied with the declar-
ation of Helsinki, relevant laws, and institutional guidelines.
Alcohol administration
Drinks were orange juice mixed with either 40% alco-
holic vodka or water. The amount of vodka was calcu-
lated depending on the participants’ body weight to
obtain blood alcohol levels (BAC) of 0.05%. The mixture
was divided into three equal portions. Two of the drinks
were served with 5 min apart, prior to commencing the
task. Up to 3 min was allowed for drinking each unit,
followed by 2 min of mouth-wash to remove the residual
alcohol in the mouth. About 40 minutes after the second
drink, the third booster drink was served to reduce noise
due to measuring during the ascending versus descend-
ing limbs of the blood alcohol curve [83]. To enhance
the alcohol taste, all the drinks had a lemon soaked in
vodka, and the glass in which drinks were served was
sprayed with vodka beforehand. To mask the alcohol
taste all drinks contained three drops of Tabasco sauce
(McIIhenny Co., USA) [84]. Thus in either condition,
participants were unable to distinguish alcohol from pla-
cebo on the basis of smell or taste.
Procedure
Each participant performed the experiment twice with
2 to 7 days in between. They were informed that they
would receive a low dose and a high dose of alcohol
for two sessions. This assured the presence of expect-
ancy effects in both sessions. In one test session, they
received alcoholic drinks; in the other session, they
were actually given placebo drinks. Sessions took
place between 12:00 and 6:00 p.m. at fixed times
across conditions per individual. The order of
experimental conditions was randomized in a double-
blind cross-over design. Breath alcohol concentration
(BrAC) was measured using the Lion alcolmeter® SD-
400 and registered at four times during each session
(i.e., baseline, after the first two drinks, pre and post
the third drink, and by the end of the computer task).
BrAC was measured by a second experimenter, who
also prepared the beverages, with the primary experi-
menter always remaining blind to alcohol conditions
and BrAC. A short manipulation check interview was
performed at the end of each session to make sure
participants are aware of the alcohol content of the
drink. Participants provided informed consent prior to
participation and were compensated with 20 euro for
participation, plus a maximum of 5 euro extra de-
pending on their performance. They were allowed to
leave the lab only when their BrAC value was below
0.02% in the drink session.
Chasing memo task
Task details were identical to those reported in Experi-
ment I, except for a color adjustment (the circle that
turned from orange to blue and vice-versa in Experiment I
turned from red to green and vice-versa in Experiment II),
to better mimic traffic light-related associations with stop-
ping and going. A practice stage and a test stage contain-
ing three free blocks and three cued blocks were included.
EEG data recording and preprocessing
Continuous EEG data were recorded using the BioSemi
ActiveTwo system [85] and sampled at 2048Hz. Record-
ings were taken from 64 scalp electrodes placed on the
basis of the 10/20 system, and two additional electrodes
were placed on the left and right mastoids. In addition,
four electrodes were used to measure horizontal and verti-
cal eye movements. In the BioSemi system, the ground
electrode is formed by the Common Mode Sense active
electrode and the Driven Right Leg passive electrode.
All EEG data were preprocessed and analyzed with
EEGLAB v.13.5.4b [86], an open source toolbox for
Matlab and Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0. Four participants
were excluded from the analysis. One participant always
disengaged when the star was presented on the screen
(contrary to instructions). Three other participants had to
be discarded due to technical malfunctions. Therefore
data analyses were based on the remaining 16 participants.
Data were imported to EEGLAB with average mastoids as
the reference. Then, downsampled to 512Hz and digitally
filtered using a FIR filter (high pass 0.016 Hz and low pass
70Hz, with an additional 50Hz notch-filter). The EEG
traces were then segmented into epochs ranging from −
3000 to 1000ms (− 3000 to − 2500 was used for baseline
correction), time-locked to the last disengagement
moment before the completion of a trial.
Before artifact removal, trials in the free condition with-
out a valid voluntary disengagement (i.e., disengagement
occurring within 2 s following the bonus star, after which
the trial ended automatically) were discarded, as intentional
inhibition cannot be verified in these cases. Subsequently,
artifact removal was accomplished in two steps. The first
step consisted of visual inspection of the epochs to remove
those containing non-stereotyped artifacts such as head or
muscle movements, on the basis of manual and semi-
automatic artifact detection (50 μV/ms maximal allowed
voltage step, 150 μV maximal allowed difference of values
in the epoch). This resulted in averages (SD) of 45.06
(7.30), 44.56 (9.37), 53.0 (7.47), and 52.94 (7.45) trials for al-
cohol/free, placebo/free, alcohol/cued, and placebo/cued
conditions, respectively. The number of epochs removed
never exceeded 25%. Secondly, an independent component
analysis (ICA) was performed using the ‘runica’ algorithm
available in EEGLAB [87]. The extended option was used
that implements a version of the infomax ICA algorithm
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[88] resulting in better detection of sources with sub-
Gaussian distribution, such as line current artifacts and
slow activity. Then we applied the algorithm ADJUST that
automatically identifies artefactual independent compo-
nents by combing stereotyped artifact-specific spatial and
temporal features [89]. ADJUST is optimized to capture
blinks, eye movements, and generic discontinuities and has
been validated on real data. After exclusion of artefactual
components the data were reconstructed based on an aver-
age (SD) of 55.57 (3.72), 57.69 (2.91), 56.75 (3.15), and
58.75 (3.21) ICA components in the alcohol/free, placebo/
free, alcohol/cued, and placebo/cued conditions, respect-
ively. The number of independent components removed
did not exceed 14% of the total in any of the conditions.
Afterward, data were re-referenced using the current
source density (CSD) transformation [90] as imple-
mented in Brain Vision Analyzer [91] (with the parame-
ters degree of spline = 4; maximum degrees the Legendre
polynomial = 15). The CSD transformation uses surface
Laplacian computation to provide a reference-free esti-
mate of the local radial current density rather than dis-
tant/deep (neural) sources [92, 93]. A major advantage is
that CSD leads to the enhanced spatial precision of the
recorded EEG activity [94, 95] and thus acts as a spatial
filter. Finally, epochs were averaged for each participant
and experimental condition for further statistical ana-
lysis. Previous literature indicates that the supplementary
motor areas contribute considerably to the generation of
the RP. Although some studies have analyzed the RP
based on a pool of electrodes surrounding FCz, several
studies suggest that the activity of these regions is best
captured by electrode FCz [96, 97], especially after CSD
transformation. This was confirmed by visual inspection
for each participant. Statistical analyses were therefore
conducted only on this electrode.
Data preparation and statistical analysis
Task performance The calculations for median Engage
RT, Disengage RT and W-interval were the same as in
Experiment I. Engage RTs of less than 100ms were re-
moved, resulting in 916 (95%), 885 (92%), 892 (93%),
and 931 (97%) trials for alcohol/free, placebo/free, alco-
hol/cued, and placebo/cued conditions, respectively. For
Disengage RT in the free condition, if the participant did
not voluntarily disengage within the provided time, that
trial was removed. This resulted in 788 (82%) trials for
the alcohol condition and 836 (87%) trials for the pla-
cebo condition. Independent t-tests were performed to
compare performance under placebo and alcohol condi-
tions for each of these dependent variables.
EEG Four indices extracted from the ERP topographic
plots were analyzed, including RP onset latency, RP peak
amplitude, AUC, and RP build-up interval (from onset la-
tency to peak latency). For RP onset latency, since auto-
mated algorithms failed to yield consistent and robust
latencies for most participants, three authors (YL, GFG, &
RR) independently judged the EEG time courses for each
individual trial, while they remained blind to Inhibition
Category. The raters hand-picked (through computer-
aided scrolling procedures) the RP onset as the moment
in time (in ms) when the signal began to deviate and
showed a steady switch towards the negative direction.
The inter-rater reliability calculated by intraclass correl-
ation was 0.96, which indicated high consistency among
raters. AUC was quantified as the total surface in the time
window between onset latency and peak latency, using the
R package ‘stats’ (version 3.3.0) [98]. A two-way within-
subject repeated-measures ANOVA was implemented
with Alcohol (alcohol/placebo) and Inhibition Category
(free/cued) as factors.
Conventional and Bayesian-based analysis As in Ex-
periment I, we did both conventional and Bayesian-based
paired t-test and repeated-measures ANOVA analysis for
the main dependent variables. Bayesian repeated-measures
ANOVA compares all the models against the null model.
BF was provided every time a main factor or interaction
was added to the model, allowing us to establish how each
main factor and the interaction contributed to the model.
Results
BrAC
The descriptive values at each reading can be found in
Additional file 1. In brief, BrAC peaked after the third
drink, with a mean value of 0.06% and a standard devi-
ation of 0.10.
Task performance
In brief, acute alcohol use did not exert meaningful ef-
fects on Engage RT/Disengage RT in either the cued or
free condition. Similarly, alcohol did not influence tim-
ing accuracy and W-interval. More detailed information
can be found in Additional file 1.
EEG
RP onset latency Repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed
that the main effect of Inhibition Category was significant
(F (1, 15) = 46.89, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.70), with much earlier
onsets in the free condition (M = − 1229ms, SD = 710) than
in the cued condition (M = − 205ms, SD = 464, see Figs. 2
and 3). The main effect of Alcohol was not significant (Al-
cohol: M = − 693ms, SD = 839; Placebo: M = − 742ms,
SD = 745; F (1, 15) = 0.14, p = 0.72, η2 = 0.01). The inter-
action between Alcohol and Inhibition Category was also
not significant (F (1, 15) = 0.20, p = 0.66). Bayesian repeated
Liu et al. BMC Psychology             (2020) 8:2 Page 12 of 20
measures ANOVA showed that a model that contained
only Inhibition Category provided a fit that was 3.6 times
better than a model that added the factor Alcohol, and 10.3
times better than a model that further added the interaction
effect. These results together confirmed the significant
main effect of Inhibition Category in the absence of main
and interaction effects of Alcohol.
AUC Repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed a significant
main effect of Inhibition Category (F (1, 15) = 21.04,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.58), with a much greater AUC in the free
condition (M = − 40,563 (μV/m2)* ms, SD = 37,332) than
in the cued condition (M = − 13,348 (μV/m2)* ms, SD =
13,815, Fig. 4). Although the AUC appeared reduced
under alcohol compared to placebo, the main effect of Al-
cohol failed to obtain significance (Alcohol: M = − 23,323
(μV/m2)* ms, SD = 25,692; Placebo: M = − 30,588 (μV/
m2)* ms, SD = 35,771; F (1, 15) = 1.22, p = 0.29, η2 = 0.08).
The interaction between Alcohol and Inhibition Category
was not significant (F (1, 15) = 0.29, p = 0.60). Bayesian re-
peated measures ANOVA showed that a model that con-
tained only Inhibition Category in the model provided a
fit that was 2.3 times better than model that added the fac-
tor Alcohol and 5.8 times better than a model that further
added the interaction effect. These results together con-
firmed the significant main effect of Inhibition Category in
the absence of main and interaction effects of Alcohol.
Summary of EEG results Since the results of the ana-
lyses on RP peak amplitude and build-up interval were
highly redundant to those of AUC, these results can be
found in Additional file 1. In general, the four ERP indi-
ces provided a consistent pattern of the RP that was in-
fluenced considerably by the factor Inhibition Category
but was not influenced by the factor Alcohol. Under free
inhibition, the RP began to develop almost 1000 ms earl-
ier than under cued inhibition. Also, under free inhib-
ition, the RP reached higher peak amplitudes than under
cued inhibition. Accordingly, the AUC is larger for free
than for cued inhibition. Generally speaking, only under
free inhibition condition, there was a clear RP before
disengagement. But these effects were not impacted by
the acute effects of alcohol.
Discussion
In this experiment, we tested how moderate acute alco-
hol use influences intentional inhibition and stimulus-
driven inhibition, at behavioral as well as neural levels.
Fig. 2 Boxplot of the onset latency (in ms) of the Readiness Potential per group: Alcohol (alcohol vs. placebo) × Inhibition Category (cued vs.
free). Only a main effect of Inhibition Category is observed
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RP developed over the frontocentral cortex about 1200
ms before intentional inhibition was effectuated but not
before stimulus-driven inhibition. It turned out that al-
cohol administration had hardly any effect, either behav-
iorally or on neural correlates of intentional inhibition
and stimulus-driven inhibition. These null-findings were
corroborated by Bayesian analyses that confirmed there
was stronger evidence for the null hypothesis than for
the alternative hypothesis.
Stimulus-driven inhibition
In contrast to previous findings on impaired stimulus-
driven inhibition after alcohol intake [67–71, 99, 100], no
alcohol effects were observed on stimulus-driven inhib-
ition as measured in the Chasing Memo task. Since the
present study did not include a SST or a GNG task, we
cannot tell whether the lack of effects is specific to the
Chasing Memo task or pertains to our alcohol manipula-
tion in the present sample.
A number of potential reasons may explain the discrep-
ancy between the present and previous findings in the lit-
erature. First, the doses of alcohol administered in the
present study may have been too low to produce manifest
alcohol effects. Previous studies have demonstrated effects
on ERP components under comparable alcohol doses and
sample size [101]. But compared with the flanker task they
used, disengaging from visuomotor tracking in the Chas-
ing Memo task was relatively easy. And it has been
pointed out that the easier the task, the more alcohol is
needed to cause performance impairments [17]. Our con-
clusions cannot be generalized to the full range of acute
intoxication. Second, alcohol effects may be confounded
with individual differences in alcohol expectancy effects
[102]. For instance, it has been observed that those who
expect less alcohol-induced impairment indeed displayed
Fig. 3 Surface Laplacians over electrode FCz for the free and cued inhibition under alcohol or placebo conditions. Traces are time-locked to
disengagement time (time 0). The scalp map shows mean activity in the time window of the RP, as defined by RP onset and peak amplitude for
the free inhibition condition under alcohol. Electrode FCz is marked in the scalp maps (black dot)
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less impairment, irrespective of actual consumption [103–
105]. Without an additional control group (participants
who do not get any alcohol, and who know so) in the
current study, it is difficult to distinguish between expect-
ancy and pharmacological effects of alcohol [106]. Third,
although alcohol intake resulted in similar BACs
across participants, there might still exist non-trivial
individual differences in the actual impairment in-
stilled by alcohol [106].
Intentional inhibition
Previous studies did not examine the EEG effects of al-
cohol on intentional inhibition. We observed no effects,
neither from the perspective of stopping impulsivity nor
waiting impulsivity. The factors that were discussed that
potentially play a role in the absence of alcohol effects
on stimulus-driven inhibition may also pertain to
intentional inhibition. In particular, individual differ-
ences in the actual impairment caused by alcohol [106].
Indeed, individual data in our study showed that roughly
half of the participants had earlier RP onsets under alco-
hol, while the opposite pattern was observed among the
other half. Furthermore, a true effect might have been
missed due to low power from the small sample size.
Future studies may explore such individual differences
more systematically and recruit a larger sample. Second,
the requirement to report the W-moment might inter-
fere with the main task at hand (continue/disengage
tracking). This process required attention shifting (i.e.,
have a glance of the counter) and working memory stor-
age (i.e., keep this number in memory). Meanwhile, the
reliability of reported W-moment has been questioned
[107]. Therefore, future studies not focused on con-
sciousness may consider discarding this element.
General discussion
Many studies have investigated the relationship between
alcohol use and inhibition, but all previous studies focused
on stimulus-driven inhibition, typically tested with var-
ieties of the GNG and SST. Here, we expanded this focus
by testing alcohol effects on intentional inhibition in two
studies: focused on past-year risky drinking and short-
term alcohol use respectively. Both intentional inhibition
and stimulus-driven inhibition were tested. We found no
relationship between past-year moderate recreational alco-
hol use with both types of inhibition and no differences
related to moderate acute alcohol administration. The
main finding was that the RP showed an earlier onset and
Fig. 4 Boxplot of the area under the curve (AUC) (in (μV/m2)*ms) of the Readiness Potential per group: Alcohol (alcohol vs. placebo) × Inhibition
Category (cued vs. free). Only a main effect of Inhibition Category is observed
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higher peak values for intentional compared to stimulus-
driven inhibition, independent of alcohol administration.
Regarding stimulus-driven inhibition, its null association
with past-year alcohol use is to some extent in corres-
pondence with the literature. Presumably, a threshold ef-
fect rather than a linear relationship exists between typical
alcohol use and response inhibition. That is, only when
the accumulated alcohol consumption surpassed a certain
threshold or a diagnosis of AUD is confirmed, long-term
alcohol use is accompanied by impaired inhibition [108–
111]. Accordingly, our conclusions cannot be readily gen-
eralized to the population with AUD. On the other hand,
our lack of effects of acute alcohol use on stimulus-driven
inhibition is more at odds with previous research. A study
by Marczinski et al. (2005) using a cued GNG showed im-
paired inhibition of a button press (i.e., a discrete motor
response) under the influence of alcohol [112]. However,
alcohol did not influence inhibition performance if partici-
pants had to release instead of press a button (i.e., a con-
tinuous movement). This latter response type seems to
resemble the ongoing tracking movements in the Chasing
Memo task. The employment of discrete go responses can
explain why the acute effects of alcohol are frequently re-
ported on GNG and SST [67, 69] but not in our task.
Regarding intentional inhibition, our studies represent
the first exploration of a potential link with alcohol use and
misuse. Neither effects of trait drinking patterns (social/
problematic) nor acute alcohol effects were observed. This
negative finding coincides with a recent finding in
Parkinson patients. Three groups of participants (healthy
control, Parkinson with and without impulsive-compulsive
behaviors) did not differ on intentional inhibition perform-
ance measured by the Marble Task [113]. This suggests
that populations that typically show comorbid impaired re-
active inhibition, such as Parkinson disease, ADHD, and
substance use disorder, can still keep intentional inhibition
capability intact.
At the neural level, a slow negative potential appeared
1200ms exclusively before intentional inhibition, which
provides evidence that the RP also reflects the preparation
of stopping a motor action. Together with the evidence
that the RP develops prior to the process irrelevant to ac-
tion [114–116] and its amplitude is influenced by the de-
gree of intentionality [117–119], it is concluded that RP
reflects neural processes related to intention formation ra-
ther than motor preparation [114, 120, 121]. This can also
be interesting in relation to the current discussion on the
brain disease model of addiction [122] and with respect to
the question if long-term alcohol-dependent patients show
problems in intention formation and/or execution.
We acknowledge a number of limitations of our study.
First, in the Chasing Memo task, participants were obliged
to disengage on all free trials. The moment of disengage-
ment was ‘at will’, but disengagement at any point during a
free trial was mandatory rather than voluntary. If we had
added the ‘whether’ option and let participants determine
more freely if and when to disengage, alcohol might still in-
fluence decisional aspects of intentional inhibition [123].
Just like the priming effect of alcohol, preload drinking pro-
moted loss of control over further drinking behavior [17].
In that way, acute alcohol use should increase the probabil-
ity of accepting another beer rather than when you accept
it. We are currently exploring intentional inhibition and ef-
fects of alcohol in a modified version of the Chasing Memo
task with a ‘whether’ option added. Second, gender was dis-
proportionally distributed in both experiments. In Experi-
ment I, there was more females than males. We, therefore,
added gender as a covariate in the main analyses and con-
firmed its null effect. Experiment II included only male par-
ticipants given sex differences in metabolic alcohol
processing. We cannot be sure if the current findings
generalize to females. Future studies might aim at more
gender-balanced samples. Third, our sample size in Experi-
ment II is relatively small, but studies with a similar topic
and study design confirmed its power [77]. Fourth,
there is room for alcohol administration and placebo
conditions to be improved, given that although all
participants reported they received alcohol in the pla-
cebo condition, the amount is less than that in the al-
cohol condition; the experimenter blind to alcohol
condition may interact with participants differently in
two conditions (alcohol/placebo) due to the partici-
pants’ status (drunk/sober). We acknowledge this as a
potential shortcoming, although these are common is-
sues in this field, and generally not considered overly
detrimental to interpretation.
We end by providing a few suggestions for future
research into this field. First, the target population
may include heavier binge drinkers and/or alcohol-
dependent patients. It has been shown that impair-
ments in inhibitory control after a moderate dose of
alcohol are more pronounced in binge drinkers than
in non-binge drinker subjects [124]. This might help
explain that when these individuals become intoxi-
cated, they are less able to refrain from the impulse
or desire to consume more alcohol, leading to further
binge drinking. Further, one might employ intraven-
ous alcohol administration to keep the BAC at a
steady level for a prolonged time [125]. This can help
control the acute tolerance effect of alcohol (reduced
impairment at a given BAC on the descending limb)
[126]. In addition, alcohol-related cues may be em-
bedded in the task as they are more salient for heavy
drinkers (compared to light drinkers) and can impact
on inhibitory processes [127, 128]. Also, it is interest-
ing to explore whether only a subgroup of the
drinkers with specific drinking patterns and personal-
ities show intentional inhibition deficits.
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Conclusion
This is the first empirical study on the role of intentional
inhibition in relation to alcohol use. In two experiments,
we found that both past-year risky drinking and moder-
ate acute alcohol did not affect intentional inhibition,
suggesting that alcohol does not moderate the ability to
stop at will in the present study. Factors that might ex-
plain these null findings, such as the lifetime amount of
alcohol used, alcohol administration dosage, and re-
search paradigms were discussed. Caution should be
taken when extending these conclusions to AUD popu-
lations and higher intoxication levels (e.g., 0.08%). In
addition, we found an event-related brain potential, the
readiness potential (RP), that appeared 1.2 s before the
intentional inhibition of action. No RP was visible before
stimulus-driven inhibition. This indicates that the RP
might reflect the formation of an intention in general ra-
ther than only signifying motor preparation.
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